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Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s assertion that female judges might be better than male judges has
generated accusations of sexism and potential bias. An equally controversial claim is that
male judges are better than female judges because the latter have benefited from affirmative
action. These claims are susceptible to empirical analysis. Using a data set of all the state high
court judges in 1998–2000, we estimate three measures of judicial output: opinion production, outside state citations, and co-partisan disagreements. For many of our tests, we fail to
find significant gender effects on judicial performance. Where we do find significant gender
effects for our state high court judges, female judges perform better than male judges. An
analysis of data from the U.S. Court of Appeals and the federal district courts produces
roughly similar findings.

I. Introduction
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s suggestion, prior to her elevation, that women might be better
judges than men ignited an inferno of criticism in the months leading up to her confirmation hearings, and she backed away from it (Lithwick 2009; Dickerson 2009). The claim
contradicts a more familiar notion that presidents and other elected officials must engage
in affirmative action favoring women in order to ensure that the judiciary has a sufficient
mix of women and men. Justice Sotomayor’s claim that, because of their backgrounds,
women are better judges than similarly qualified men, implies that presidents do not
appoint less competent women but merely engage in a kind of statistical reverse discrimination by treating femaleness as a proxy for judicial quality.
The idea that women might be better—or no worse—judges than are men breaks
from taken-for-granted assumptions of the recent past. Female judges were rare before the
1970s (Schafran 2005). In 1977, Rose Bird was the first woman appointed to the California
Supreme Court and by 1980, 14 women sat on state high courts among several hundred
men (Curriden 1995). Sometime after 1980, the political establishment decided that
women should have greater representation on the courts. By 1995, more than 50 female
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judges had joined the state high courts (Curriden 1995; Songer & Crews-Meyer 2000). We
find that, in the period from 1998 to 2000, more than 100 women sat on the state high
courts, roughly a quarter of the total. The federal courts similarly witnessed a dramatic
increase in the fraction of female judges during the past two decades (Hurwitz & Lanier
2008).
Much of this change no doubt resulted simply from the increasing numbers of
women who have entered the legal profession since the 1970s. Since this time, politicians
likely engaged in affirmative action, giving preference to female candidates who are less
qualified than men on the basis of standard measures, such as length of time in the
profession. Women serving on state high courts starting in the late 1990s generally went to
law school in the mid 1970s, where they were the distinct minority in law schools and in the
legal profession. If there is a smaller pool of women from which to select judges (compared
with the pool of potential male judges), then forcing the selection of a substantial number
of women may result in more qualified men being passed over, thereby reducing overall
court performance (Buchanan 2009; Shapiro 2009).
The bulk of the literature on gender and judging examines what we call the “differential viewpoints” question.1 This literature focuses on the subject areas where female judges
are likely to bring a distinctive perspective to bear. The most prominent finding is that
female judges are more likely to favor plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases (Peresie 2005;
Boyd et al. forthcoming). This result does not, however, cast light on whether female judges
are better or worse than men. The empirical research has not established that the female
judges are legally correct in these cases; it is possible that those plaintiffs should have lost.
Our focus is on the relationship between the gender of judges and judicial quality.
We cannot directly test Justice Sotomayor’s claim that female (or Latina) judges exercise
superior judgment because we do not have a direct measure of the quality of opinions, but
proxies for the overall quality of judicial performance are available. Drawing on prior work
on judicial output, we focus on opinion publication, citations, and disagreements with
co-partisans as metrics of judicial performance. Using three data sets—justices sitting on the
highest courts of the 50 states from 1998 to 2000, federal appellate judges from 1998 to
2000, and federal district judges from 2001 to 2002—we test whether gender has a significant effect on judicial performance. With qualifications that will be discussed below, for
many of our tests on data from the state high courts we are unable to reject the null
hypothesis of no gender effects and instead find only insignificant gender-related differences. Where we do reject the hypothesis that gender has no effect for our sample of state
high court judges, we find that female judges in fact perform better than male judges. Our
analysis of U.S. federal circuit and district court judges produces roughly similar results.

1
See Beiner (1999), Davis (1993), and Sherry (1986). Research in this area has asked whether there are variations in
the outcomes of cases in certain areas due to the different perspectives women bring to the bench (Davis 1993; Allen
& Wall 1993). Scholars have examined whether female judges rule differently in subject areas perceived to involve
women’s issues or areas where women’s supposed liberal leanings will make a difference, such as criminal law matters
(Songer et al. 1994; Jackson 1997; Martin & Pyle 2000). Although the overall picture is unclear (Palmer 2001), the
general story appears to be that female judges support the rights of women more strongly than do their male
colleagues (Martin & Pyle 2005; McCall & McCall 2007; McCall 2008).
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II. Predicting Gender Differences
One distinctive characteristic of U.S. courts, as compared to their counterparts in most
other countries, is that judges come to the bench later in life, roughly around age 50, after
significant experience outside the judiciary. The aggregation of these prior experiences
constitutes a judge’s human capital—in effect, his or her training to become a judge. A
lawyer with more legal experience should be a better judge than a lawyer with less legal
experience. In addition, attending a better law school should, theoretically, provide better
training for the tasks associated with judging. Further, because judicial candidates coming
to the bench have a major portion of their professional career behind them, they have likely
passed through numerous selection screens already.
These factors suggest two opposite sets of predictions. Under what we call the
preference story, women who are less qualified than men are selected to be judges, with the
result that female judges perform less competently than do male judges. Our empirical tests
focus on the preference story, which has support in the literatures on women in the legal
profession. Alternatively, under the screening story, prejudicial barriers to entry—including
sex discrimination and employment conditions that are hostile to the needs and interests of
women—screen out less competent women. Even though the resulting pool of women
candidates for the judiciary might be smaller than the pool of men, the women who remain
in that pool after the informal screening might be of higher quality than the men. Assuming
that there are but a small number of judicial positions, a small pool of women might still
provide more than adequate numbers of candidates to select from as the large pool of men.
Ultimately then, the screening story implies that female judges should be as competent
as—or more competent than—male judges.
A. The Preference Story
1. Women Law Students and Lawyers
Research on gender and legal education suggests that women have a lower quality experience in law school than do their male colleagues. They participate less in classroom
discussion, feel more alienated, and underperform in terms of the traditional indicators of
success in law school such as grades, law review membership, and publications (Banks 1990;
Guinier et al. 1994; Mertz et al. 1998; Mertz 2007; Leong 2009). Female students also are
disproportionately excluded from social networks among students, faculty, and alumni and
ultimately receive less value from their educations (Guinier et al. 1994; Leong 2009).
This pattern of limited access continues at the next stage, early legal employment.
The initial job for lawyers out of law school provides basic apprenticeship for fresh law
graduates; after a few years they can take that training to other jobs (Garth & Sterling 2009).
In this apprenticeship, women may receive fewer advantages than men do. Within private
law firms, research suggests that women (and other outsiders) receive less in terms of
training, mentoring, and networking opportunities (Garth & Sterling 2009; Wilkins &
Gulati 1996, 1998). In addition, multiple studies find that women are more likely to enter
into the public sector than their male counterparts, thus forgoing the apprenticeship
experience altogether (Hull & Nelson 2000; Wood et al. 1993).
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2. Female Judges
Our statistical analysis focuses on individuals who were judges in the late 1990s and early
2000s, and (for the most part) went to law school in the 1970s or before. As of the early
1970s, the fraction of women in law schools was in the 10–20 percent range (Epstein 1993;
Savage 2009). Because women in this cohort likely dropped out of the legal profession at a
greater rate than men to care for family members or pursue other opportunities, the
effective pool of women qualified for judgeships was even smaller by the 1990s. Despite the
relatively small pool of potential female judges, the fraction of female judges in our data set
of state high court judges from 1998 to 2000 was 24.1 percent. Under the preference story,
the disproportionate selection of women judges—given the lower training among women
attorneys both at law school and in their early employment—leads to less qualified judges.
There is also the matter of discrimination women might face after they become
judges. A series of reports produced by gender bias taskforces around the country starting
approximately two decades ago suggested the presence of bias against women participating
in the judicial system, including female judges (for overviews, see Resnik 1996; Kearney &
Sellers 1996). Facing such discrimination requires female judges to expend greater effort
than their male colleagues to have their views heard and requests fulfilled (Barteau 1997;
Gandy et al. 2003; Haddon 2008). Justice Ginsburg recently observed:
It was a routine thing [in the past] that I would say something and it would just pass, and then
somebody else [who was male] would say almost the same thing and people noticed. I think the
idea in the 1950s and ‘60s was that if it was a woman’s voice, you could tune out, because she
wasn’t going to say anything significant. There’s much less of that. But it still exists, and it’s not
a special experience that I’ve had. I’ve talked to other women in high places, and they’ve had the
same experience. (Bazelon 2009)

Research on other professional settings suggests the possibility that women and other
outsiders can sometimes become stuck with disproportionate shares of administrative
burdens (Carbado & Gulati 2000); this might occur on the courts as well. The prospect of
bad working conditions might deter more qualified women (with a resulting higher opportunity cost) from pursuing or accepting judgeships—further diminishing the quality of
women judges.
3. Women, Risk Aversion, and Conflict Avoidance
The third body of literature relevant to our predictions concerns women generally, as
opposed to women lawyers or judges. Multiple studies find that women display a greater
degree of risk aversion than do men (Levin et al. 1988; Powell & Ansic 1997; Corrigan
2009). Women are also found to be less competitive, more averse to conflict, and less prone
to aggression than are men (Stuhlmacher & Walters 1999; Gneezy et al. 2003; Croson &
Gneezy 2008). The implications of these studies generally are ambiguous for judicial
performance. For example, risk-averse judges might be better because they take greater
care with their opinions, or worse because they fear offending colleagues or powerful
people. There are implications for certain specific aspects of judicial performance, such as
the willingness to openly disagree with a co-partisan. The literature suggests that judges
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prefer not to dissent because dissenting invites outside scrutiny of the court and creates
more work for colleagues (Posner 2008). As a result, judicial colleagues can sometimes take
umbrage at dissenting behavior (Posner 2008) and a number of courts have norms against
dissenting (Brace & Hall 2005). Risk-averse and conflict-averse judges, therefore, are likely
to dissent less (Dumas 2010). In contrast to the preference story, one might not expect the
women in the screening story to be risk averse or conflict averse. Given the hurdles they
have had to clear, those women who remain probably have a greater inclination toward
taking risks and tackling conflict. Further, having had to succeed in male environments
might mean that these women are not primarily interested in certain “women’s” topics such
as family law; instead, they are probably interested in, and adept at, tackling a wide range
of issues.
B. Data and Measures
Our data set has information on several objective metrics of judicial performance for all
state high court judges in the United States for the years 1998–2000. There are 409 judges,
of whom 103 (or 25.18 percent) are female. For each judge, we collected data on three
separate measures: the number of published opinions, the number of citations from
outside the state (that is, nonprecedent driven citations) to majority opinions, and open
disagreements (dissents) with those from the same political party background (our
measure of judicial independence).2 Others have questioned the value of the objective
measures and some have suggested alternate measures (Cross & Lindquist 2009; Baker et al.
2009). For purposes of this article, we tie our predictions of gender differences to the
objective measures as opposed to general notions of quality. Although the measures are
rough proxies, we have found in other work that they are correlated with other factors in
a theoretically sound way (Choi et al. 2009a, 2009b, 2010, forthcoming)3 and so provide at
least a starting point in assessing gender differences in judicial production. We also assume
that the inadequacies of our objective measures are not a function of gender, allowing us
to assess how men and women perform differentially on our measures. In analyzing the
results, we control for variations among the states.
C. Predictions
The predictions below are simplified hypotheses based on the preference story and the
screening story.
1. Opinion Publication Rates
Publishing an opinion, as opposed to issuing an unpublished disposition, we assume,
takes greater effort (Choi et al. forthcoming). Further, the designation of the opinion as

2
The information on numbers of published opinions, dissents, and citations was collected from the LEXIS database
for the years in question. For specific coding schema, see Choi et al. (forthcoming).

3
For example, elected judges and appointed judges differ in a systematic way. In addition, judges close to retirement
are less productive and judges with more court experience are more productive (Choi et al. forthcoming).
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published brings greater external scrutiny and, therefore, greater risk of criticism. We
predict under the preference story that female judges will publish fewer opinions than their
male colleagues because they are likely to have received lower amounts of legal training and
are more likely to be risk averse. The screening story makes the opposite prediction—
women judges should publish either more (or at least no fewer) opinions compared with
male judges.
The publication of an opinion gives it greater precedential weight. If women are
more interested in advancing the law in certain areas, they will focus their publication
efforts in those areas. Given the scholarship cited above that suggests that female judges are
more likely to hold in favor of female plaintiffs in civil rights cases than are male judges,
women might devote more effort to cases involving civil rights and family law, resulting in
more opinions or more frequently cited opinions in those areas. The subject matter
prediction is not tied to either the preference story or the screening story, but is supported
by the scholarship, is related to a number of debates, and worth testing.
2. Citations
Citations by outside authorities are a commonly used measure of influence (Landes et al.
1998). We collect data on the number of outside state citations to majority opinions by a
variety of outside actors, including other state courts and the federal courts outside the
relevant circuit.4 Citations to judicial opinions have been described as measuring multiple
characteristics of the underlying opinions, including quality of analysis (Choi et al. 2009a,
2009b, forthcoming), nimbleness in writing (Vladeck 2005), and creativity (Posner 2005).
If, as predicted under the preference story, women lawyers ascend to the bench with
fewer legal skills and are more risk averse than their male colleague, then female judges
should write less frequently cited opinions. Women may be less likely than their male
colleagues to have built up networks among lawyers and other judges, resulting in fewer
citations. If the techniques of reasoning and the perspectives of female judges are markedly
different from those of male judges, then the majority of judges (who are men) will likely
prefer to cite opinions by male judges (Lithwick 2009). In contrast, the screening story
suggests that the opinions of female judges will receive the same if not greater number of
citations compared with male judges.
Beyond the preference and screening stories, other predictions are possible.
Women judges may receive a differential number of citations in certain subject matter
areas, also driven by stereotypes. If there is a perception that women understand better
and pay more attention to issues in certain areas—what are considered “women’s”
domains, such as family law or sex discrimination cases—we would expect to see more
citations to female judges in these areas. Conversely, we would expect fewer citations to
female judges in areas considered “male,” such as business law.

4
We define the number of outside-state citations to a majority opinion as the sum of outside federal court + other state
court + U.S. Supreme Court citations to that majority opinion. All citations are from the LEXIS Shepard’s database
and are tracked up until January 1, 2007.
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3. Disagreement
Our third measure, an assessment of judicial independence, looks at the willingness of a
judge to disagree with co-partisans, either by dissenting against their opinions or writing
majority opinions that induce dissents. We look first at the number of disagreements by a
judge against co-partisans divided by the total number of disagreements by the judge
against a judge of either party (Same_Party). We used the following methodology to
determine the political parties for each of our state high court judges (used in determining
whether a disagreement is against a co-partisan). We looked to three sources of information
on party membership. First, we searched NEXIS and the Internet (using Google) for any
news reports on the political affiliation of the each judge. Second, we searched for information on political contributions at the opensecrets.org website. We used the political party
of the donee candidate as a proxy for the political party of judges who contributed. Where
a judge contributed to candidates from more than one political party, we did not use the
opensecrets data to assign a political affiliation to the judge. Third, we used the party of the
governor (if any) who appointed the judge as a proxy for the judge’s political party. In most
of the cases where we had multiple sources of information on political party, the party was
consistent across these sources. Where we found no data on the judge’s political affiliation
or the judge’s affiliation was neither a Democrat nor a Republican (but was instead an
Independent), we ignored the judge for purposes of calculating the independence
measure. When our three sources reported different parties, we gave first priority to the
party identified through our NEXIS and Internet searches, second to the party identified in
the opensecrets.org database, and third to the party of the appointing governor.
This measure gives us a raw sense of how often a particular judge is in open disagreement with co-partisans. A highly partisan judge, for example, may never come in disagreement with a co-partisan (preferring to save his or her dissents primarily for judges from the
opposite political party). How often a judge opposes a co-partisan, of course, will depend on
the number of co-partisans on the same bench. If a judge is the lone Democrat on a specific
court, the judge will necessarily oppose opposite-party judges (due to the lack of any
co-partisans).
To control for court composition, we look second at the total number of majority
opinions by co-partisans (opportunities to dissent) over the total number of majority
opinions by all judges on the court (Same_Pool).5 We then define independence as the
difference between (1) the number of disagreements by a judge against co-partisans divided
by the total number of disagreements by the judge (Same_Party) and (2) the total number
of majority opinions by co-partisans (opportunities to dissent) over the total number of
majority opinions by all judges on the court (Same_Pool). A more negative score corresponds to a judge who writes opposing opinions against opposite-party judges more

5
There are problems with this measure that we document in Choi et al. (2009a, 2009b, 2010). Among them is that our
measure does not work for the handful of states where all the judges are of the same party. Accordingly, we drop those
states from our independence calculations (including Georgia, Maryland, New Mexico, South Carolina, and South
Dakota). Further, as a function of the number of judges of each party on a court, the potential scores for a judge are
bounded. To adjust for this, we calculated a simpler, alternate measure of independence.
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frequently than the background pool of majority opinions authored by opposite-party
judges. Conversely, a more positive score corresponds to an authoring judge who writes
opposing opinions less frequently against opposite-party judges compared with the background pool of opinions (and thus more frequently against co-partisans).
We treat a more positive score as indicative of a more independent judge. Others
might view disagreement among judges as a negative—a sign of disagreeability or cantankerousness. Regardless of perspective, the prediction under the preference story is that
women will disagree less. If the preference story is correct, female judges, because they are
less likely to be willing to engage in open conflict, particularly with co-partisans, should
receive lower scores on our independence measure. Further, their relatively lower levels of
legal training (from discrimination in school and in the workplace) should also make them
less willing to engage in conflict, since their (mostly male) opponents will have greater skill
and experience. In contrast, the screening story predicts that women judges will receive a
higher independence score.
To summarize, we have five predictions regarding gender differences to show up in our
measures if the preference story is correct. Female judges will publish fewer opinions
overall (Hypothesis 1), but more opinions on topics of specific interest to women such as
family law (Hypothesis 2). Female judges will be cited less overall by outside courts (Hypothesis 3), but more on topics of specific interest to women such as family law (Hypothesis 4).
Women will score lower on their willingness to disagree with co-partisans (Hypothesis 5).
Three of these predictions (Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5) address the question of whether female
judges underperform their male counterparts. The other two (Hypotheses 2 and 4) test
whether (any) differential performance on the part of female judges is explainable due to
a specific subject matter focus on the part of female judges.

III. Different Pathways
A. Education and Training
The preference story assumes that female judges have less experience and lower-quality
training than male judges. We test whether this assumption is true. In our data set, female
judges have worse educational credentials than do male judges. Panel A of Table 1 reports
summary statistics for our sample of state high court judges. The average U.S. News rank6 of
the law school attended by a male judge is approximately 52 and that for a woman judge is
63 (difference not significant). The rankings difference is larger for undergraduate education, where the average college ranking for a woman judge is 154 and that for male judge
is 125 (difference significant at the 1 percent level).

6
To have consistent and reliable information about the rankings of the schools that these judges attended, we used
data from 2002. U.S. News and World Report data on college rankings is available only back to 1983. In other words, we
do not have information on the rankings at the time these judges attended college and law school but, as these
rankings tend to be fairly stable over long periods of time, we are confident in using the 2002 version of the rankings
(see the Appendix for details).
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State High Court Judges

Panel A: Background Characteristics for State High Court Judges
Men

Chief judge
Court experience
Post-law-school experience
Close to retirement
Age
Private practice
PAJID
US News BA ranking
US News JD ranking
In-state school
Married
Number of children
Divorced
Selection method
Appointed
Merit selection
Nonpartisan elections
Partisan elections

Women

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

p Value

0.1809
7.8268
32.9186
0.3750
58.5809
0.8355
36.9277
124.6352
52.4013
0.6213
0.6494
1.9141
0.0459

0.0221
0.4231
0.4815
0.0278
0.4851
0.0213
1.2898
4.9459
2.3747
0.0280
0.0164
0.0659
0.0072

0.1667
4.6408
25.6842
0.1863
52.9314
0.7647
38.8382
154.2937
62.8700
0.6000
0.5778
1.0556
0.0556

0.0371
0.5551
0.8504
0.0387
0.7933
0.0422
2.2411
10.3061
4.5186
0.0492
0.0301
0.0822
0.0140

0.735
0.0001
0.0000
0.000
0.0000
0.112
0.4463
0.00289
0.1524
0.723
0.132
0.0000
0.490

0.1993
0.3300
0.2614
0.2092

0.4001
0.4710
0.4401
0.4073

0.2524
0.2233
0.3689
0.1553

0.4365
0.4185
0.4849
0.3639

0.255
0.041
0.037
0.234

Panel B: Gender and Production, Citations, and Independence for State High Court Judges
Men

Total number of published opinions per year
Number of majority opinions per year
Number of outside-state citations per majority opinion
Independence score

Women

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

p Value

26.145
18.846
0.7084
-0.0516

0.598
11.909
0.0148
0.0118

24.086
16.783
0.8138
0.0093

0.938
10.209
0.0295
0.0190

0.0100
0.0415
0.0891
0.0087

Notes: For Panel A, p value is calculated from chi-square (chief, close to retirement, private practice, in-state
school, married, as well as selection methods), t test (court and post-law-school experience, age, PAJID, US
News BA and JD ranking, children), and Fisher’s exact (divorced) tests. For Panel B, p value is from a two-sided
t test of the difference in means between male and female judges; data for the total number of published opinions,
majority opinions, and citations are logged in the calculations of p values but left unlogged for mean and standard
deviation comparison in the table.

The gender differences in the types of schools attended appear to be within those law
schools ranked 50 or under, which is approximately half the law schools. Between men and
women who attended the top five law schools, there are few differences; similar results are
seen among those judges who attended top-10 schools. However, among those judges who
attended a top-50 school, there are significant gender differences, as 47 percent of men
attended these schools, compared to 38 percent of women (difference significant at the 5
percent level). In effect, it is when one goes below the “elite” law schools that a difference
emerges in the quality of institution that male and female judges attended.

Judging Women

513

One other variable that we also examined was whether the judge was employed in a
judicial clerkship after graduating from law school. Unreported, we find that men are more
likely to have done judicial clerkships, but the data are available for only a small group of
judges. A clerkship is not only a sign of high performance in law school, but also is a source
of legal training.
B. Prior Professions
Panel A of Table 1 reports the primary prior professions of the state high court judges in
our sample. One might expect that women judges would come more often from publicsector jobs, consistent with the patterns for women lawyers more generally (Dau-Schmidt
et al. 2007; NALP Foundation 2004). There are several possible explanations for why
women are more likely to work in the public sector than men: first, women have more
difficulty in tackling the work-life conflict presented by modern law firm jobs (Garth &
Sterling 2009). Second, women—because of discrimination or less mentorship—are less
likely to receive either training or promotion in the law firm context (Garth & Sterling
2009). There is also research on entering women law students suggesting that they are
initially more interested in public interest work than their male colleagues are (DauSchmidt et al. 2007) but, by the end of law school, the expectations of men and women
students appear to converge in favor of private-sector jobs (Dau-Schmidt et al. 2007; Ku
2008). To obtain information on the primary prior professions of a judge, we obtained
information on their prior jobs reported in Who’s Who (2007). Lacking consistent information on the length of experience in the private versus public sector for each judge, we
instead track the job that a judge held immediately prior to becoming a judge. As this job
is a measure of a judge’s pre-judicial experience, we use it as a rough measure of prior
employment. Panel A of Table 1 reports that 83.6 percent of male judges were in private
practice, compared to 76.5 percent of female judges—a difference that is not statistically
significant.
C. Marriage, Children, and Age
Background variables such as marriage and number of children, although not necessarily
part of the preference story, are potentially relevant control factors as gender differences in
these variables could have an impact on performance. Age is also a potentially revealing
variable: younger judges are likely to have less experience and training.
The women in our state high court judge data set are less likely to be married than
the men and more likely to be divorced (see Table 1). This is consistent with reports on
professionals (including lawyers), where women have both lower marriage rates and higher
divorce rates than their male counterparts (Wilson 2008). The differences in marriage and
divorce rates among men and women judges in our sample, however, are not significant.
We find also that male judges have more children than female judges. Reported in Panel A
of Table 1, the average is one child for the women versus just under two children for the
men (difference significant at the 1 percent level). Women also are less likely to have
children than men (43 percent of the women have children vs. 57 percent of the men).
These numbers are perhaps more indicative of the screening story than the preference
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story: women who succeed at becoming judges at a high level are those who have chosen
their careers over a family.
In terms of age, the women in our state high court judge sample attended and
graduated from law school later than their male colleagues. The average JD date for women
is 1972 versus 1965 for the men. Given the years of graduation, it is safe to assume that many
of these women likely faced significant barriers when they were law students; in 1972,
women made up only 10 percent of the JDs (Catalyst Report 2009). Law school environments were hostile to women during the early 1970s, when their numbers were small
(Epstein 1993). Measured in 2000, the mean age of male judges in our sample is 58.6 and
the mean age of women judges is 52.9 (difference significant at the 1 percent level).
Comparing the judge’s age at graduation from law school to his or her age at becoming a
judge, we see that women rise more quickly to judgeships; unreported, it takes female
judges, on average, 21 years from JD to judgeship, while it takes male judges over 26 years
(difference significant at the 1 percent level). As a result, women are younger (48 years old)
than their male counterparts (51.5 years old) when they become state high court judges
(difference significant at the 1 percent level). We also find, unreported, that women are
older when they graduate from law school, regardless of the year of graduation. The
foregoing is consistent both with the preference story and with the screening story. Looking
at the preference story, the smaller pool of available women lawyers to choose from
probably meant that those selecting judges had to go deeper into the pool—hence, selecting female judges who were younger and less experienced than their male counterparts.
On the other hand, women who are overachievers might take less time to accomplish
professional goals, which fits the screening story.
D. Type of Judicial Selection System
Finally, we examine the type of judicial selection systems for state high court judges most
likely to yield female judges. The bottom portion of Panel A of Table 1 reports that female
judges are most numerous in states with nonpartisan election systems (and, to a lesser
extent, appointment systems) and less present in merit selection states. It is hard to make
much out of this, except perhaps that officials are more likely to engage in affirmative
action than is the public.

IV. Testing the Hypotheses
A. Predictions of Gender Underperformance
Panel B of Table 1 reports the raw differences in publication rates, outside citations, and
independence for our sample of state high court judges.7 Generally, men publish more,
writing and publishing an average of 26.15 opinions per year, while women write and

7
We use slightly different levels of analysis for each of these measures: citations are measured at the individual-opinion
level; production is measured for each judge for each year; and independence is for each judge with all years
combined.
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publish 24.09 opinions per year (difference significant at the 1 percent level).8 Looking just
at majority opinions, we find that male judges published 18.85 majority opinions per year;
female judges published only 16.78 majority opinions per year (difference significant at the
5 percent level). However, women are cited9 more than their male counterparts (0.81
outside state citations per opinion for women and 0.71 for men, a difference that is
significant at the 10 percent level) and are more independent (significant at the 1 percent
level). Unreported, we also examined the page numbers of opinions published (both
majority and total) as an alternate measure of productivity and found no significant gender
differences. At the first cut, then, women outperform men on two of three measures.
However, the various states differ in terms of the characteristics of their legal systems and
the types of disputes they receive. To say anything meaningful about gender differences,
therefore, one has to correct for state differences.
States vary along a number of dimensions, including differences in population, crime
rates, court structures, and judicial salaries. As there is no reason to expect big variations in
these state-specific variables in the three years in our sample (1998–2000), we estimate
using a state-fixed-effects model, which controls for state-level differences in independent
variables. We estimate the following equations using regressions on pooled judge-level data
(Independence), judge-year-level data (Production), and opinion-level data (Citations).10
Independence (ordinary least squares model with robust standard errors):

Independencei = α + β1i Female + State Fixed Effects + ε i
Production (negative binomial regression with errors clustered by judge):

Number of Majority Opinions per Yeari = α + β1i Female +
State Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + ε i
Citations (negative binomial regression with errors clustered by judge):

Number of Outside State Citations per Majority Opinion i = α + β1i Female +
State Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects + Subject Matter Controls + ε i
We include year fixed effects for both the Production and Citation models but not
for the Independence model, which is estimated on data pooled over the 1998 to 2000

8
P values are calculated using the log of citation and publication variables to control for the nonnormal distribution
of the data.

9
We use citations from courts outside the state throughout the article. We also test a variety of citation types, including
law review citations and citations from different types of citing courts. Unreported, women are cited at the same level
or more than are their male counterparts regardless of whether looking law review citations or a specific type of court
citation. Law review citations are for law reviews as tracked by the LEXIS Shepard’s database (until January 1, 2007).

10

As the Production and Citations data presented here are count data, we use negative binomial regression with
standard errors clustered at the judge level to estimate the Production and Citations models.
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Table 2: Gender and Production, Outside Citations, and Independence for State High
Court Judges

Female
Constant
Subject matter controls
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects
N
R2

Independence

Production (Number of
Majority Opinions
per Year)

Citations (Number of
Outside-State Citations per
Majority Opinion)

0.0641**
(3.29)
-0.0252
(-0.62)
No
Yes
No
350
0.299

-0.056
(-1.37)
4.117**
(43.99)
No
Yes
Yes
1080
N/A

0.0145
(0.28)
-0.806**
(-3.58)
Yes
Yes
Yes
25025
N/A

Notes: T statistics in parentheses; +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. The Independence model is estimated on judgelevel data with ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. The Production (judge-year-level data) and
Citations (opinion-level data) models are estimated using a negative binomial regression. R 2 is unavailable with
negative binomial regressions. Errors in the Production and Citations models are clustered by state judge. Subject
matter controls include indicator variables for the following case subject matter areas: administrative, attorney and
client, capital punishment, church and state, commercial, criminal, family, First Amendment, labor, property, rights,
and torts (with “other” as the base category). The subject matter areas are defined in the Appendix.

sample time period. For the Citations model, estimated on opinion-level data, we include
controls for the subject matter of the case. A criminal law case will generate a different
number of outside state citations, all else equal, compared with a commercial law case.
Subject matter controls (defined in the Appendix) include the following case subject
matter areas: administrative, attorney and client, capital punishment, church and state,
commercial, criminal, family, First Amendment, labor, property, rights, and torts (with
“other” as the base category).
As Table 2 shows, once we correct for state fixed effects, the gender differences
for both publications and outside citations disappear, suggesting that men and women
are performing at roughly the same levels. Differences remain in the independence
regressions after inserting state controls, with female judges scoring higher on independence (significant at the 1 percent level). Thus far, we find little support in the data for
the preference story’s prediction (Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5) that female judges will
underperform—if anything, female judges outperform male judges, at least on our independence measure. To examine the question of the importance of gender effects and
judicial performance, we estimate separate models for each of our measures with a variety
of control variables.
B. Controlling for Judge Background Characteristics
The state high court judges in our sample vary on a number of individual characteristics,
all of which might affect judicial outcomes. Some of these variables are proxies for
human capital, including education, years of experience, or prior profession. An important element of the preference story is that those female lawyers who become judges have
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a lower accumulated amount of human capital from their careers (including law school
and private practice) and, therefore, will not perform as well as the male judges. We find
(see Table 1) that the women judges graduated from lower-ranked law schools and
undergraduate institutions, have less post-law-school experience or experience on the
court, and are generally younger. This suggests that the assumptions underlying the preference story have support. However, our state-fixed-effects findings lead us to ask alternate questions about why we see either insignificant or positive effects for women on our
measures of judicial output. The first question is whether the traditional measures of
human capital have purchase in the gender and judging narrative. It may be, for
example, that the effect of gender is indirect. Judges who graduated from lower-ranked
law schools may perform worse due to their relatively lower human capital; women, in
turn, are more likely to have graduated from lower-ranked law schools (and thus have
lower human capital). If the answer is yes, that the preference story is correct, we should
expect to find significance for our judge background variables in our production, quality,
and independence models. If the answer is no, and focusing on traditional measures of
human capital is the wrong approach, we should see no significant effects of any background variable in the models.
Note that the results already reported in Table 2 suggest that the preference
story, with its emphasis on traditional human capital measures, does not hold up.
If it had, women would have had scores significantly lower than those for men in
our state-fixed-effects models in Table 2. Instead, we found that while women did
have lower levels of human capital (on the traditional measures), they still scored
just as well as the men on our measures, even without controlling for background
differences.
To test the importance of traditional human capital, we add independent variables
for a variety of judge-level background factors, collectively referred to as “judge controls,”
to the Independence, Production, and Citations models of Table 2. Our judge controls
include whether the judge was the chief judge of the high court. A judge who is chief judge
may have less time to author opinions, but also may command greater respect and receive
greater numbers of citations as a result, for her opinions. The chief may also be able to
assign herself the more important opinions and garner more citations that way (Langer
2003). For experience, we include the number of years between 1998 and the year in which
the judge received her law degree (post-law-school experience) and the number of
years the judge has been on the high court (court experience). More experienced judges
may decide opinions with greater skill, leading to more citations. We include a variable
valued at 1 for whether a judge retired from the bench in 2001 or earlier and 0 otherwise
(retirement close).
We also include a number of variables specific to the background of the individual
judge measured as of 2000. These include the age of the judge (age), whether the judge
was married (married), the judge’s number of children (number of children), whether
the judge was divorced (divorced), and whether the judge’s primary experience before
becoming a judge was in private practice (private practice). We include the PAJID
score for each judge as developed by Brace et al. (2000). These scores locate judges on
a political continuum from highly conservative (0) to highly liberal (100). We lastly
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Table 3: Gender and Production, Citations, and Independence for State High Court
Judges (with Judge Controls)

Female
Chief judge
Court experience
Post-law-school experience
Retirement close
Age
Married
Number of children
Divorced
Private practice
PAJID
US News JD ranking
In-state law school
Constant
Subject matter controls
State fixed effects
Year fixed effects
N
R2

Independence

Production (Number of Majority
Opinions per Year)

Citations (Number of Outside
State Citations per Majority
Opinion)

0.0809**
(3.62)
-0.0071
(-0.28)
0.0021
(1.04)
0.0001
(0.08)
0.0271
(1.11)
0.0001
(0.05)
0.0286
(1.05)
-0.00338
(-0.37)
0.0638
(1.58)
-0.0344
(-1.04)
0.00004
(0.07)
-0.0006
(-1.64)
0.0286
(1.18)
-0.00460
(-0.04)
No
Yes
No
327
0.339

-0.0384
(-1.41)
-0.0536*
(-1.99)
0.0144**
(5.78)
-0.0000929
(-0.03)
-0.254**
(-8.29)
-0.00161
(-0.54)
0.0451
(1.25)
0.0174*
(2.04)
0.0369
(1.12)
0.0696+
(1.96)
0.00100
(1.53)
0.000325
(0.82)
-0.0704*
(-2.31)
4.031**
(28.11)
No
Yes
Yes
943
N/A

0.0518
(1.08)
-0.0463
(-0.92)
0.00237
(0.63)
-0.00240
(-0.51)
-0.0590
(-1.22)
-0.00210
(-0.48)
-0.0686
(-1.25)
0.0319*
(2.08)
-0.0701
(-0.83)
0.0335
(0.59)
0.00118
(1.15)
0.0000995
(0.15)
0.00360
(0.07)
-0.397
(-1.60)
Yes
Yes
Yes
23629
N/A

Notes: T statistics in parentheses; +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. The Independence model is estimated on judgelevel data with ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. The Production (judge-year-level data) and
Citations (opinion-level data) models are estimated using a negative binomial regression. R 2 is unavailable with
negative binomial regressions. Errors in the Production and Citations models are clustered by state judge. Subject
matter controls include indicator variables for the following case subject matter areas: administrative, attorney and
client, capital punishment, church and state, commercial, criminal, family, First Amendment, labor, property, rights,
and torts (with “other” as the base category).

include variables relating to the judge’s education, including the U.S. News ranking of
the judge’s law school measured in 2002 (US News JD ranking), and whether the
judge went to an in-state law school (in-state law school). Table 3 reports the results
of the models. We include in the Appendix a description of the sources for all our
variables.
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1. Publications
We estimate a negative binomial regression model for production, with the number of
majority opinions per year as the dependent variable, adding judge controls to the model
in Table 2 (errors clustered by judge). In the model, as reported in Table 3, female is
insignificant. For all judges, whether the judge was the chief judge and whether the judge
was close to retirement turn out to be relevant; both have a negative effect on publication
rates. This is not surprising, as chief judges have additional responsibilities, while a judge
who is close to retirement may be slowing down. None of the traditional human capital
measures, such as prior employment or law or undergraduate school rankings, are significant. The years of court experience and the number of children a judge has, as well as
whether the judge attended an in-state law school or has private practice experience, are
also significant.
2. Citations
We estimate a negative binomial regression model for production, with the number
of outside-state citations to majority opinions as the dependent variable, adding judge
controls to the model in Table 2 (errors clustered by judge). In the model, as reported in Table 3, female is insignificant. Moreover, except for the number of children
the judge has, none of the judge “control” variables are significant. The level of analysis here is the individual opinion, so the number of observations is much higher than
in the Production model of Table 3; state, subject matter, and year controls are
included.
3. Independence
In the Independence model of Table 3 with the addition of judge controls, we find that the
coefficient on female remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The Independence model is estimated with ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. As with
the Independence model in Table 2, the Independence model in Table 3 provides evidence in support of the view that female judges perform as well if not better than male
judges. To summarize, the above three sets of findings are inconsistent with Hypotheses 1,
3, and 5. We find little support for the preference story, as almost none of the background
variables are significant.
Overall, these findings suggest that women serving on state supreme courts are either
able to overcome their lack of training, or that the job of being a state high court judge
simply does not require skills learned in higher-ranked law schools and private practice.
These results call into question the focus on traditional measures of human capital in
predicting the performance of female (and male) judges.
C. Predictions of Differential Interests
Our next two hypotheses (2 and 4) draw on the idea that women might have different
subject area interests than men and, therefore, might invest effort in law making in
different areas than men. One possible criticism of our results is that women are on par with
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Table 4: Gender and Subject Matter Differences in Production for State High
Court Judges

Administrative
Attorney
Capital
Church
Commercial
Criminal
Family
First Amendment
Labor
Property
Rights
Torts
Other
Total

Number of Majority
Opinions per Year—Men

Number of Majority
Opinions per Year—Women

z Value

1.354
0.578
0.738
0.006
2.809
6.162
1.417
0.062
1.565
1.156
0.298
2.296
0.405
18.846

1.139
0.566
0.629
0.000
2.386
5.562
1.457
0.037
1.270
1.015
0.330
2.097
0.296
16.783

0.0729
0.6102
0.1538
0.7639
0.2071
0.7115
0.9577
0.1495
0.3524
0.7088
0.8983
0.7527
0.1853
0.3381

Female Significant
in Full Model? a
No
No
No
Yes,
No
Yes,
No
Yes,
Yes,
No
No
No
No
No

negative
negative
negative
negative

a

Each model used the log of the number of published majority opinions within a subject matter category for each
judge as the dependent variable, with female, judge controls, and state and year fixed effects as independent
variables. This column indicates whether the female gender variable is a significant predictor of the log of the
number of published majority opinions within the specific subject matter category, and whether the variable has a
positive or negative effect.
Notes: Z values calculated using a Mann-Whitney test. The dependent variable in the Full model is the number of
majority opinions in a particular subject matter area summed for the 1998 to 2000 period for each judge. Female,
judge controls, and state and year fixed effects as independent variables (estimated with negative binomial regressions
on judge-level data). We estimate the Full model using a negative binomial regression model with robust standard
errors on judge-level data.

men only because they excel in certain traditionally female-focused areas of law (such as
family law). Outside these areas, the preference story may still prevail. To examine this
question, we examined publication and citation numbers as a function of specific subject
areas.11
Table 4 reports summary statistics on the number of majority opinions published per
year categorized by gender and by subject matter. We borrow the subject areas from Epstein
and Segal (2000) (see Appendix for definition of subject matter categories). We find a wide
variety of significant differences with simple difference of means tests, although there are
no clear patterns of gender-specific subject specialization. Generally, female judges publish
fewer majority opinions in the administrative category of cases. This difference—or the lack
of other differences—may be driven by underlying differences in caseloads across the
different states and other factors. To control for this, we estimate a series of negative
binomial regression models with robust standard errors on judge-level data using the
number of published majority opinions within each specific subject matter category

11

For independence, because the measure is a function of cases where the judges openly disagreed in writing, the
number of data points is relatively small as compared to the data on citations and publications. The result of having
fewer data points on the independence variable is that it is not meaningful to break those data down by subject area.
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summed for the 1998 to 2000 period for each judge as the dependent variable and include
female, judge controls, and state and year fixed effects as independent variables (referred
to in Table 4 as the “Full” model). Table 4 reports that in the series of Full models, female
judges publish fewer majority opinions in the church, criminal, First Amendment, and
labor categories. Based on these models, women do seem to publish less than men in
several areas, but none of these are in “traditional” female-focused subject matter areas as
predicted in Hypothesis 2. Moreover, there is no indication that women are publishing
more cases in the family law area.
Turning to Hypothesis 4, we examine whether women are cited less or more in
specific subject areas. As women may be seen as experts in areas relating to family law or
gender-based rights, we expect that women will be cited more in these areas, but less in
areas such as business law that are outside of women’s stereotypical domain. Looking
first at the number of outside state citations to majority cases published in each subject
area, we find no differences in citation rates between men and women in any particular
subject area (although women are cited more in the residual “other” category; significant
at the 10 percent level).
We estimate a series of negative binomial regressions with robust standard errors
on judge-level data with the sum of the number of outside-state citations to all majority
opinions in a particular subject matter area written by a judge during the 1998 to 2000
period as the dependent variable. We include gender, judge controls, and state and year
fixed effects as independent variables (referred to in Table 5 as the “Full” model). We find
that female is not significant in any of these models in explaining the number of outsidestate citations for specific subject matter areas. Female judges are not cited significantly less
than are their male counterparts in any subject area, suggesting that other judges view
female judges’ opinions as holding the same weight as their male counterparts’ opinions.

V. Gender in the Federal Courts
To evaluate whether our results are unique to the state high courts, where there is tremendous variation in terms of court systems and state effects, we report data on the federal
courts of appeals and district courts for roughly the same time periods (1998–2000 for the
courts of appeal and 2001–2002 for the district courts).12 Owing to constraints in the data
sets, we are able to estimate gender comparisons for only a subset of the hypotheses.
Further, because of the relatively small size of the appeals court data set, we were unable to
use as many controls as we did with the state court data.
A. Appeals Courts
The data for the courts of appeals, collected for a prior project (Choi & Gulati 2008) have
information for all the active federal circuit court judges during the period 1998 to 2000

12

The time periods for the different data sets do not perfectly overlap because the federal court data were collected
for different projects; see Choi et al. (2010) and Choi and Gulati (2008).
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Table 5: Gender and Subject Matter Differences in Citation Rates for State High
Court Judges

Administrative
Attorney
Capital
Church
Commercial
Criminal
Family
First Amendment
Labor
Property
Rights
Torts
Other
Total

Number of Outside-State
Citations per Majority
Opinion—Men

Number of Outside-State
Citations per Majority
Opinion—Women

z Value

Female Significant in
Full Model?a

0.452
0.707
0.786
—
0.983
0.662
0.625
1.191
0.436
0.455
1.203
0.954
0.471
0.708

0.488
0.736
1.170
—
1.133
0.716
0.939
1.182
0.478
0.536
0.976
1.056
0.662
0.814

0.5402
0.7922
0.6452
—
0.5588
0.9002
0.7548
0.7967
0.7964
0.4596
0.4870
0.1591
0.0928
0.0009

No
No
No
—
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

a

Each model used the number of outside-state citations for majority cases in each subject area as the dependent
variable, with female, judge controls, and state and year fixed effects as independent variables. As with the publication
table, this column indicates whether the female gender variable is a significant predictor of the level of citations from
outside the state a case receives, and whether the variable has a positive or negative effect.
Notes: Z values are calculated using a Mann-Whitney test. There were no majority opinions authored by a female
judge in the church category. The dependent variable in the Full model is the sum of the number of outside-state
citations to all majority opinions in a particular subject matter area written by a judge during the 1998 to 2000 period
(estimated with negative binomial regressions on judge-level data). Female, judge controls, and state and year fixed
effects as independent variables. We estimate the Full model using a negative binomial regression model with robust
standard errors on judge-level data.

who had been on the bench at least two years and were under the age of 65 at the time. Data
were collected for three measures similar to our measures of state judge quality: number of
majority opinions published per judge (for the 1998 to 2000 time period), the average
outside federal circuit citations to majority opinions per judge, and co-partisan disagreements, controlling for the political makeup of a particular circuit court (as a measure of
independence).13 We estimate ordinary least square regression models with independence
and the log of 1 + the average outside federal circuit citations per majority opinion as
dependent variables on circuit-judge-level data. We estimate a negative binomial regression
with the number of majority opinions published per judge in the 1998 to 2000 time period
as the dependent variable on judge-level data.14 In all our models we include female as an
independent variable and controls for circuit effects since the circuits likely differ in both
behavioral norms and caseloads.

13

We did not have data on subject areas so as to be able to test whether there were gender differences in the types of
cases the judges wrote opinions on or for which they received citations.

14

The number of majority opinions published per circuit court judge in the 1998 to 2000 time period is count data,
making the negative binomial regression model appropriate.
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Federal Court of Appeals Judges

Female
Constant
Circuit effects
N
R2

Independence

Production (Number of Majority
Opinions per Judge)

Citations (Log of 1 + Average
Outside Federal Circuit
Citations per Opinion)

-0.0285
(-0.76)
-0.0615
(-0.54)
Yes
98
0.144

-0.048
(-0.86)
4.875**
(89.09)
Yes
98
N/A

0.00207
(-1.76)
1.800**
(26.62)
Yes
98
0.403

Notes: T statistics in parentheses; +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01. The Independence and Citations models are
estimated on judge-level data using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors. The Production (number of
majority opinions) model is estimated on judge-level data using negative binomial regression with robust standard
errors.

The coefficients for female in all the models of Table 6 are not significantly different
from zero. We find that female circuit court judges do not have significant differences in
independence, production (measured by the number of majority opinions), and citations
from courts outside their federal circuit compared with male judges.
B. District Court
For the district courts, we used data for the 629 federal district judges who were active in the
2001–2002 period.15 Because these judges sit individually, we are unable to calculate independence scores in a fashion similar to the state high courts; instead, we focus on two
dependent variables. We use the average publications per filing as our measure of production, assessed using district-judge-level data. We define the average publications per filing
for a federal district court judge as the total number of published opinions for the judge
divided by the average number of filings per judge in that judge’s district (total filings
for the district divided by number of judgeships in that district).16 We use as our measure
of citations the number of outside positive citations per majority opinion assessed on
opinion-level data. We track the number of positive outside-circuit federal court citations to

15

We lack data on all our control variables for each judge, leading to fewer observations in our regression models in
Table 7. For example, we have full data for only 533 district court judges in the publications per filings model in
Table 7.

16

By published opinions, we mean opinions that are available in the published reports issued by Westlaw. Although
Westlaw can publish whatever opinions it wants to publish, anecdotal reports suggest that Westlaw simply publishes
whatever opinions judges choose to designate as published opinions. In recent years, because of the widespread
availability of judicial decisions in electronic databases, and particularly due to the passage of the E-Government Act,
the distinction between published and unpublished opinions may have become less important. However, we suspect
that the choice to send an opinion for inclusion in the print version is still an important one that reveals information
about the case in question and the judge. That said, we constrain our database of opinions to roughly the period
immediately prior to the passage of the E-Government Act in late 2002. See E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L.
107-347, 116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. § 101, H.R. 2458/S. 803) (enacted Dec. 17, 2002, with an effective date for most
provisions of Apr. 17, 2003).
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Federal District Court Judges

Female
Constant
District judge controls
N
R2

Production: (Log of 1 + Average
Publications per Filing)

Citations (Number of Outside Positive
Citations per Majority Opinion)

-0.000641
(-0.18)
0.0204**
(3.37)
Yes
533
0.064

0.01794*
(3.13)
0.4563**
(14.56)
Yes
12,173
N/A

Notes: T statistics in parentheses; +p < 0.10; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. District judge controls are defined in the text in
Section V.B. The Production model is estimated on judge-level data using ordinary least squares with robust standard
errors. The Citations model is estimated on opinion-level data using negative binomial regression. Errors in the
Citations model are clustered by federal district judge.

a federal district judge’s published majority opinions using Westlaw. As is common in the
citation literature, we use outside-circuit citations rather than total citations (including
in-circuit citations) because in-circuit citations might reflect intracircuit norms.17
We estimate an ordinary least square regression model with the log of 1 + average
publications per filings as the dependent variable on district-judge-level data. We estimate
a negative binomial regression with the number of outside positive citations per majority
opinion as the dependent variable on opinion-level data.18 Our key independent variable in
our regression models for district judges is female. We use the following for district judge
controls: we include indicator variables for black judges (black), and judges of other racial
minority groups (other race). Our experience variables include indicator variables for the
judge’s prior profession immediately before becoming a federal district court judge as
follows: whether the judge worked as a judge, such as a magistrate judge, prior to becoming
a federal district court judge (prior judge), the judge worked as a prosecutor (prior
prosecutor), and the judge worked in private practice (prior private practice). To
capture the salience of a judge’s mix of cases, we develop a variable (salient) by dividing
the judge’s number of salient published cases by the judge’s total number of published
cases. Salient cases are those involving church and state, campaign finance, federalism, First
Amendment, and other constitutional rights (Choi & Gulati 2008, which relies on the
methodology of Epstein & Segal 2000). For our political controls, we use an indicator
variable for whether the judge was appointed by a Democratic president (judge Democrat) and a variable for the judge’s experience in years defined as the difference between
2002 and the appointment year of the judge (judge experience). We also include in our
district judge controls an indicator variable for chief judge status during either 2001 or 2002
or both (chief judge) and an indicator variable for whether the judge attended one of the

17

This number includes citations by state courts that are outside the circuit in question.

18

The number of outside positive citations to a majority opinion is count data, making the negative binomial
regression model appropriate.
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Sotomayor Data
Citations (Number of Outside
Federal Circuit Citations to
Majority Opinions)

Production (Number of Majority
Opinions)
2004–2006
Calabresi
Clement
Garland
Garza
Jones
Lynch
McConnell
McKeown
Raggi
Schroeder
Sotomayor
Wardlaw
Wilkinson
Williams
Wood

72
81
65
112
77
215
119
67
53
60
90
51
88
123
156

784
240
264
255
335
998
630
404
438
120
706
207
537
397
831

Notes: Both the number of majority opinions and the number of outside federal circuit citations are measured for
the 2004 to 2006 time period.

three top law schools as measured by U.S. News in 1992—Harvard, Yale, and Stanford—
which also were the three law schools most frequently represented among the circuit court
judges in our sample (top school).
We do not find significant gender differences in the average publications per filing,
but we do find significant gender differences in the outside positive citations for published
majority opinions, with women outperforming men (significant at the 5 percent level).19
C. Justice Sotomayor Versus the Others
As Justice Sotomayor’s statements and the reactions they generated were the starting point
for our project, we examined data on her as well. To estimate a meaningful comparison, we
calculated the number of majority opinions (published) and the number of outside federal
circuit citations to all majority opinions for the 2004 to 2006 period for then-Judge Sotomayor. As a control, we estimated similar measures for six court of appeals judges who were
rumored either to have been on President Obama’s short list or President Bush’s short list.
In addition, we also included two other Second Circuit judges who were active during the
same period, Judges Calabresi and Raggi.

19

It is possible that gender may work indirectly through judge characteristics (e.g., if a female judge is more or less
likely to become a chief judge). Including district judge controls may therefore understate the impact of gender. As
a robustness test, we removed the district judge controls and substituted district court effects. Unreported, we
obtained the same qualitative results for both models of Table 7.
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The comparisons here are necessarily rough because there are not enough judges to
control for factors such as circuit effects. That said, then-Judge Sotomayor’s outside-circuit
citation scores are among the highest of any of the judges on either president’s short list
(Posner 2009; cf. Anderson 2009); so are the scores of Diane Wood (who was among the
leading candidates for selection to the Court to replace Justice Stevens (Bazelon & Lithwick
2010)).

VI. Conclusion
We find little to no support for the preference story’s predictions that female judges would
underperform male judges (Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5). Indeed, the prediction that women
will underperform men in terms of independence scores was false. Women were more
independent than men (directly contradicting Hypothesis 5), supporting the screening
story. We also find that the equivalent performance of women and men judges is not driven
by any specific subject matter area effects (refuting Hypotheses 2 and 4). Women judges do
not perform well because of outsized performance in traditionally women-focused subjects.
Perhaps our most striking finding is that the premise of the preference story is true
(female judges have weaker credentials and less experience) but its conclusion is false
(female judges and male judges perform about the same). What might account for this
outcome? First, the measures of credential and experience might be inaccurate. We have
been told by some female judges that they went to lower-rank law schools in order to
accommodate their husbands but did very well at those schools. Our measures do not
capture this phenomenon. It might also be the case that the rank of the law school, a few
extra years of practice, and so forth make little difference for the quality of judging. Second,
the measures of judicial performance might be inaccurate. As we noted before, our objective measures of performance might not capture high-quality judicial performance. If so, we
have a “garbage-in, garbage-out” problem. Third, it is possible, as Justice Sotomayor suggested before backtracking, that women are naturally more gifted judges. The various
psychological differences between men and women might favor women, so that even if
women have less training and experience, they end up being superior judges. It might also
be the case that women’s experiences in a gender-biased world give female judges a
distinctive perspective that enhances their judicial talents.
A couple of points regarding gaps in our analysis are in order. Although we frame the
threshold question in terms of the value of gender diversity, we only arrive at that question
indirectly. Judges on the state high courts always sit in teams; an estimation of the value of
gender diversity should compare the performance of gender-diverse teams versus those of
homogenous teams. There are also likely intergenerational differences embedded within
the reported gender differences. The performance predictions for the female judges who
attended law school in the late 1960s and early 1970s may be different compared with those
who attended law school one decade later, in the early 1980s, and yet different again for
those who were in school in the early 1990s. Our data set was not large enough to make
these comparisons.
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Appendix A: State High Court Judge
Variable Definitions
Variable
Number of majority
opinions per year
Number of
outside-state
citations per
majority
opinion
Same_Party

Same_Pool

Independence

Female

Chief judge

Court experience

Definition
Total number of majority opinions authored by a
particular judge in one year (ranging from 1998 to
2000).
Total number of citations to a majority opinion from (1)
federal courts outside the circuit that includes the state
in question and (2) courts in other states. Citations are
measured for opinions authored up until January 1,
2007 (as tracked in the LEXIS Shepard’s database).
The total number of opposing opinions written against a
same-party judge divided by the total number of
opposing opinions written against either a judge of the
opposite or same party as the state high court judge in
question for the 1998 to 2000 time period. Opposing
opinions include dissents written against a majority
opinion and majority opinions where a dissenting
opinion exists.
Total number of majority opinions written by the state
high court judges of the same political party (from the
perspective of the judge in question) divided by the
total number of majority opinions written by judges of
both the same and opposite parties from 1998 to 2000.
Defined as Same_Party minus Same_Pool. A more
negative independence score indicates an increased
tendency to write an opposing opinion against an
opposite-party judge. Conversely, a more positive
independence score indicates a decreased tendency to
write an opposing opinion against an opposite-party
judge.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in question is
female and 0 if the judge is male.

For year-level data, indicator variable equal to 1 if the
judge in question is the chief judge of the court in the
year in question and 0 otherwise. For pooled data,
indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in question is
the chief judge of the court for any year from 1998 to
2000 and 0 otherwise.
For year-level data, the difference between the year in
question and the year the judge first joined the high
court. For pooled data, the difference between 1998
and the year the judge first joined the high court
(if the judge started on the court in 1998 or later,
the court experience is set to 0).

Origin of Data
Westlaw

LEXIS Shepard’s
database

Westlaw; NEXIS;
Internet (including
Google Searches);
Opensecrets.org

Westlaw; NEXIS;
Internet (including
Google Searches);
Opensecrets.org

Website for the state
highest court;
NEXIS; Internet
searches; Who’s
Who (2007)
Website for the state
highest court;
NEXIS; Internet
searches; Who’s
Who (2007)
Website for the state
highest court;
NEXIS; Internet
searches; Who’s
Who (2007)
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Appendix A Continued
Variable

Definition

Post-law-school
experience

The difference between 1998 and the year the judge
graduated law school.

Retirement close

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge in question
retired from the bench in 2001 or earlier and 0
otherwise.

Age

For year-level data, the difference between the year in
question and the judge’s birth year. For pooled data,
the difference between 1998 and the judge’s birth year.

Married

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge is married as of
the year 2000 and 0 otherwise.
The number of children a judge had as of the year 2000.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge is divorced as of
the year 2000 and 0 otherwise.
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge had private
practice experience before becoming a judge and 0
otherwise.
PAJID score for each judge as developed by Brace et al.
(2000). These scores locate judges on a political
continuum from highly conservative (0) to highly
liberal (100).
(JD) The U.S. News rankings of the judge’s law school
measured as of 2002.
(BA) The U.S. News rankings of the judge’s
undergraduate institution measured as of 2002.20
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the judge is went to an
in-state law school and 0 otherwise.

Number of children
Divorced
Private practice

PAJID score

US News JD and BA
rankings

In-state law school

20

Origin of Data
Website for the state
highest court;
NEXIS; Internet
searches; Who’s
Who (2007)
Website for the state
highest court;
NEXIS; Internet
searches; Who’s
Who (2007)
Website for the state
highest court;
NEXIS; Internet
searches; Who’s
Who (2007)
Who’s Who (2007)
Who’s Who (2007)
Who’s Who (2007)
Who’s Who (2007)

Brace et al. (2000)

U.S. News and World
Report 2002 Edition

Website for the state
highest court;
NEXIS; Internet
searches; Who’s
Who (2007)

To compare undergraduate programs across USNWR’s categories (national, liberal arts, masters, and baccalaureate
colleges), we assigned weights to each category and tier. National universities were given their actual weight (i.e., if
someone attended Stanford, he or she received a ranking of 4), liberal arts colleges were given their rank plus 50
points, and baccalaureate colleges and masters were given their rank plus 100 points. Third- and fourth-tier schools
were given an even ranking within each category. Third-tier national schools were given a ranking of 150; fourth-tier
national schools were given a ranking of 200. Third-tier liberal arts schools were ranked at 200, while the fourth tier
received a ranking of 250. Third-tier masters and baccalaureate schools received a ranking of 300, and the fourth
tier received a ranking of 350. Unranked schools were given a ranking of 400.
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Appendix B: Subject Matter Categories for State
Judge Opinions
Variable
Administrative

Attorney and client
Capital punishment
Church and state
Commercial

Criminal

Family
First Amendment

Labor

Property
Rights

Torts
Other

Definition
Review of agency/government decision making (not in another subject matter
category). Also includes government actions (e.g., state suit to comply with state
statute that does not fit in other categories); private actions suing state actors for
negligence, etc.
Attorney misconduct; attorney fees (unless fits in one of above categories);
disbarment; contempt of court order against attorney.
Capital-punishment-related actions.
Pledge of Allegiance; funding for private religious schools; prayer in school; Ten
Commandments.
Contracts; insurance; private arbitration; creditor versus debtor; lessor-lessee; usury
laws; franchise versus franchisor; employment contractual disputes; corporate
law; piercing the corporate veil; tax; bankruptcy; enforcement of mechanic’s
lien; implied warrant of merchantability.
Sentencing guidelines; prisoners’ rights; murder; rape; drugs/controlled
substances; attorney-client privilege in criminal context; grand jury related;
juvenile criminals. Excludes capital punishment cases.
Divorce; adoption; child support; probate/inheritance.
Employment issues (excluding employment contractual disputes); ERISA; National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA);
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); wrongful discharge; Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA); Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); employee
benefits; workers’ compensation claims; retaliatory discharge claims.
Employment issues (excluding (1) employment contractual disputes that are not
workers’ comp or state administrative wage rate related (commercial) and (2)
excluding discrimination-type claims (civil rights)); ERISA; NLRB; Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); wrongful
discharge; Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA); Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA); employee benefits; workers’ compensation claims; retaliatory
discharge claims; state wage rate claims.
Takings claims; zoning issues; property rights; property licensing related or permit
related; landlord-tenant related.
Race discrimination; sex discrimination; affirmative action; civil rights; age
discrimination; privacy; handicap discrimination; abortion (includes
discrimination in employment context cases); voting rights-voting related.
Federal Tort Related Act; medical malpractice; products liability; wrongful death;
libel; etc.
All other cases.

